India appealed to China to press Pakistan to bring the accused militants to justice. Beijing privately urged Islamabad to arrest and prosecute the militants, which Pakistan did, albeit briefly. In , regional tensions reached new heights after a September 18 terrorist attack in Uri in India-administered Jammu and Kashmir.
The attack was preceded by the July killing of Hizbul mujahideen commander Burhan Wani by the Indian army, which led to civilian protests and confrontations with Indian police. China has the potential to play a greater role in stabilizing the region, but thus far has been relegated to occasional crisis manager and has not proactively called for resolution of Kashmir. Moreover, according to an Indian official interviewed in October , India prefers bilateral settlement of the Kashmir issue that allows no room for external mediation, particularly by the Chinese.
Given the current trajectory of cross-border infiltrations in Kashmir that will lead to increased flare-ups in the region, China may need to rethink its periodic and limited role. The United States and China need to move beyond their traditional crisis management roles to cooperate on crisis prevention. The United States should regularly underscore the urgency of the Kashmir situation to Chinese counterparts at the highest levels and make a forceful argument that a South Asian war would directly threaten China.
Beijing could in turn prod Islamabad to prosecute terrorists involved in attacks on India as a first step. Meanwhile, the Indian government should abandon its current policy of seeking to internationally isolate Pakistan. These moves by both countries could create an opening for resuming talks and politically settling the Kashmir issue.
Khmer voacambodia. DW newsletter. India's ruling party has delivered on its promise to revoke the special autonomous status for Jammu and Kashmir. Analysts see this statement as a sign that Xi wants India to join in a broad coalition against the dominating influence of the United States. Huawei remains the biggest proxy in the U.
Tara Kartha and Ambassador Jalil Jilani look at the latest crisis in Kashmir from their respective views. Jilani, a career Pakistani diplomat, is a former ambassador to the U. This post represents the views of the authors and not those of USIP. Type: Analysis and Commentary. Last week, India made a controversial decision to revoke the special status of the disputed region of Kashmir and sent thousands of troops to quell any potential unrest. The Muslim-majority territory has been a major source of tension between India and Pakistan since it was partitioned between Yet, the biggest source of friction remains the ongoing dispute over the Sino-Indian frontier and the related problem of prolonged standoffs along the Line of Actual Control LAC.
If the LAC remains contested, both sides are likely to experience squandered economic gains; disruptive, exogenous shocks to domestic politics; and strategic distraction. Many have observed that China and India have not had a single shooting incident along the de-facto boundary — the LAC — since , when the two sides faced off at Nathu La.
The avoidance of kinetic exchanges along the LAC for more than half a century is a remarkable achievement, but this narrative is not reassuring given a major military confrontation at Sumdorong Chu in and prolonged standoffs at Ladakh in and The persistence of incursions along the LAC — combined with open-ended road-building and militarization on both sides of the line — are among the trends that suggest a greater potential for friction and escalation along the LAC in the future.
Chinese and Indian leaders seem increasingly cognizant of escalation dangers along the LAC, but neither side is doing enough to prevent protracted confrontations from happening, and both remain unreasonably confident in their ability to manage incidents when they do occur.
If Xi and Modi are serious about ameliorating tensions and reducing the potential for miscalculation, then clarifying and respecting the LAC — an endeavor China and India decided to undertake in and ,  and which this essay recommends — is a precondition for success. China and India dispute the alignment of the Sino-Indian boundary in two of three sectors: the western sector Indian-administered Kashmir and the Chinese provinces of Xinjiang and Tibet and the eastern sector the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh and Tibet.
In the western sector, the dispute revolves around 38, square kilometers known as Aksai Chin, which India claims but China administers as a result of an agreement with Pakistan in As the s progressed, Indian leaders became progressively concerned that their Chinese counterparts did not share their conception of the Sino-Indian frontier. When pressed, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai placated Nehru with assurances that Chinese maps depicting large swaths of Indian territory as part of China were outdated.
In , China announced it had constructed a highway linking Xinjiang with Tibet,  reinforcing its military position in Tibet. An Indian patrol subsequently confirmed that the Chinese road traversed Aksai Chin,  prompting India to issue a formal protest to China. Chinese leaders viewed an independent Tibet as a potential source of foreign provocations.
In the western sector, however, the PLA did not vacate territories captured during the war, which extended to the Karakoram Mountains and encompassed Aksai Chin.
For the first decade and a half that followed the conflict, China and India focused on domestic priorities, and neither country patrolled the LAC with any vigor. These dynamics fostered the conditions that led to the confrontation at Sumdorong Chu in By the early s, the Chinese and Indian militaries were in close contact at critical locales along the LAC, and Beijing and New Delhi were more and more conscious of the need to dampen escalation prospects along the disputed boundary.
It is time for Beijing and New Delhi to move forward with their mutual commitment to clarify and respect the LAC, even if formal settlements of the boundary dispute and the Tibet question remain distant prospects. A demarcation phase would follow during which the Chinese and Indian militaries would take additional steps to demarcate and respect the LAC on the ground while strictly observing and faithfully implementing existing CBMs.
New Delhi differentiates between transgressions and incursions in defining violations of the LAC, a useful distinction for this analysis. The utility of a clarified, respected LAC would lie in part in the reduction of unintentional transgressions, but also, more importantly, in the avoidance of intentional incursions that generate prolonged standoffs, escalation dangers, and a host of economic, political, and strategic problems for the two countries.
One virtue of this proposal to clarify and respect the LAC is that it envisions the effective implementation of existing CBMs and agreements rather than the arduous negotiation of new accords. China and India reached additional understandings on the boundary after the turn of the century.
This volume is an updated and expanded version of the author's original book, first published by Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and based on his cum laude. Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute with China. Authors The Policy of Non-Alignment. W. F. Van Sino-Indian Relations Prior to W. F. Van.
During Indian Prime Minister A. These CBMs have had a mixed track record. While specific measures — such as instituting SOPs that govern military interactions — may curtail escalation dangers resulting from accidental transgressions, the ongoing occurrence of protracted standoffs along the LAC suggests that the Sino-Indian CBM regime may be insufficient to prevent militarized crises and to manage escalation resulting from intentional incursions.
Implementing this proposal would require the Chinese and Indian militaries to forswear the use of cross-LAC incursions as coercive tools to alter the status quo. A final problem with the logic of deferment is that the utility of force along the LAC is likely to decline as the costs of military conflict between China and India increase, partially mitigating the negotiating advantages that either side could gain from relative power differentials.
Second, China appears loath to enshrine the status quo along the LAC because it would prefer the resolution of the boundary dispute on its terms. Third, Beijing still views the boundary dispute through the prism of the Tibet question and is likely to forgo policies — such as delimitation and demarcation of the LAC — that could limit its options should New Delhi attempt to play the Tibet card.
Chinese transgressions have been increasing for much of the past decade. China and India have a mutual interest in avoiding militarized crises or, at the extreme end, a second border war that could jeopardize economic growth, disrupt domestic politics, and engender negative strategic outcomes for both countries. Implementing this proposal could remove one of the persistent sources of bilateral tensions and a major potential catalyst of armed conflict — protracted confrontations along the LAC — with significant economic, political, and strategic benefits for both countries.
First, the Chinese and Indian economies could profit from stronger linkages, but tensions along the LAC and over other disputed territories have sabotaged repeated attempts to enhance the economic side of the relationship.